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**COMPILATION OF NARCOTICS LAWS, TREATIES,
AND EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS**

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International Drug Agreements of U.S. as of 1/1/85Bilateral AgreementsCountryAfghanistan

Agreement concerning the prohibition of opium poppy cultivation in the project area of the integrated wheat development area of the Central Helmand drainage project (phase II). Signed at Kabul August 29, 1977; entered into force August 29, 1977. 29 UST 2479; TIAS 8951.

Agreement concerning the prohibition of opium poppy cultivation in the project area of the integrated wheat development project. Signed at Kabul September 29, 1977; entered into force September 29, 1977. 29 UST 2479; TIAS 8950.

Argentina

Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the narcotics field. Signed at Buenos Aires September 15, 1972; entered into force September 15, 1972. 23 UST 2620; TIAS 7450; 852 UNTS 97.

Austria

Arrangement for the direct exchange of information regarding the traffic in narcotic drugs. Exchange of notes at Vienna April 10 and July 24, 1931; entered into force July 24, 1931. 8 Bevans 373.

Belgium

Arrangement for the direct exchange of information regarding the traffic in narcotic drugs. Exchange of notes at Brussels February 6 and June 13, 1928; entered into force June 13, 1928. 8 Bevans 545.

Belize

Agreement for the control of the illicit production and traffic of drugs, with annex. Signed at Belmopan April 6, 1983; entered into force April 6, 1983. TIAS 10686.

Amendments:

August 11, 1983 (TIAS 10686).

September 15, 1983 (TIAS 10686).

September 28, 1983 (TIAS 10686).

March 30, 1984.

Brazil

Agreement on cooperation in the field of control of illicit traffic of drugs, with annex. Exchange of notes at Brasilia July 19, 1983; entered into force July 19, 1983. TIAS 10756. Extension: October 4 and December 3, 1984.

Burma

Agreement relating to the provision of helicopters and related assistance by the United States to help Burma in suppressing illegal narcotic production and traffic. Exchange of notes at Rangoon June 29, 1974; entered into force June 29, 1974. 25 UST 1518; TIAS 7987.

Unclassified

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
Volume I
1986

to

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Prepared by

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Unclassified Edition

AFGHANISTANA.1. Status of Illicit Narcotics in Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan sparked by the Soviet invasion in 1979 and control by the Marxist regime in Kabul have made reliable estimates of narcotics production and trafficking in Afghanistan difficult. However, after a decline in the early 1980's, there are indications that both production and trafficking are on the increase. Afghanistan is probably the world's largest producer of opium for export and is the poppy source for a majority of the Southwest Asian heroin found in the United States and 80 percent of the heroin and morphine in Europe.

The 1985 opium crop in Afghanistan is estimated to have been about 300 - 400 MT, up from about 140 - 180 MT in 1984. DEA notes the usual trend and indicators which suggest Afghan production could be as high as 750-880 metric tons gross. Improved weather as well as a 40 percent increase in the price for opium gum at the Afghan-Pakistan border are responsible for the increase. Yields of opium in Afghanistan are perhaps 2-3 times higher than in Southeast Asia - some 20-30 kg./hectare - which would indicate that from 10-20,000 hectares are under cultivation. Continuous warfare in the countryside between the Afghan government (DRA) and the resistance apparently has had relatively little impact on opium production because poppy growing is generally found in isolated areas and requires little manpower, except at harvest time.

The disruption of traditional agricultural trade may have prompted more farmers to turn to poppy cultivation. It is an ideal crop in a war-torn country since it requires little capital investment, is fast growing and is easily transported and traded. Most poppy cultivation is in the provinces on the Afghan-Pakistan border; about half of this production is exported to Pakistan. Poppy is planted in the fall and harvested in the late spring.

Mashish is also traditionally produced in Afghanistan. No recent data is available on production, although it is believed to be at roughly the same levels as the mid-1970's, i.e. about 200-400 MT annually. Most is apparently consumed in Afghanistan, although there is international trafficking as well.

While much of the refining of opium into heroin for smoking and heroin hydrochloride has traditionally taken place outside of Afghanistan, there are indications that the number of heroin labs in eastern Afghanistan is growing. The lawless environment in the area, ideal for illicit activities, as well as increasing government pressure on the processors in Pakistan, may be prompting this shift.

International trafficking patterns of Afghan opium have also changed as result of the war. Although still active, traditional trade westward to Iran had declined but recovered in 1985, while trade eastward to Pakistan has increased sharply. Not only is this trade route shorter and more secure but the sharp decline in opium production in Pakistan (from 800 MT in 1978 to a range of 40 - 70 MT in 1985) has increased demand in Pakistan for opium to fill domestic as well as international demand.

Smuggling, moreover, is a traditional way of business among various tribal groups in Afghanistan. The 1400-mile Pakistan-Afghanistan border is mountainous and laced with innumerable smugglers' trails. The opium passes through the labs in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan and to Peshawar and Karachi for domestic consumption and further refining and export. To the west, opium, morphine base and heroin are smuggled into Iran and onward through Turkey to Western Europe and the US. The mujahideen organizations have condemned opium production and use.

A.2. Accomplishments in 1985

There is little evidence that the DRA, preoccupied with its war with the insurgents, has taken any serious steps to control the opium trade. Even if it attempted a suppression program, the DRA's writ does not extend to the Afghan countryside. The seizures of opium announced by the DRA (5 MT in 1984) appear to be a by-product of efforts to interdict the resistance supply lines.

A.3. Plans, Programs and Timetables

There are no indications that the DRA has any plans to reduce poppy cultivation, although publicly it asserts that production has been curtailed by its land reform programs.

A.4. Adequacy of Legal and Law Enforcement Measures

Afghanistan is a party to the 1961 Single Convention and the 1972 Protocol as well as to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Poppy cultivation has not been banned

by the DRA. However, opium and other narcotics production is prohibited except for legitimate medical uses by the 1957 Opium Act and the 1973 customs law. They are believed to be in effect, at least nominally, under the DRA. Enforcement of narcotics control is the responsibility of the Interior Ministry's Anti-Smuggling Division, but it is small and ineffective. UNFAC has a small program (\$150,000 per year) to aid the Afghan police in narcotics control. Afghanistan did not attend the September 1985 meeting of the UN's Sub-commission on Drug Traffic in the Mid and Near East at which other countries in the region (Pakistan, Turkey, Iran) discussed means to stem the flow of illicit narcotics.

Any efforts at narcotics control that the DRA might undertake are not only hindered by the war but by widespread corruption among Afghan and Soviet authorities, some of whom are reportedly engaged in the trade themselves. Indeed, the DRA probably welcomes the hard currency and Western consumer goods that the illicit traffic produces. There are press reports that the Soviet forces also have been involved in the movement of drugs or in bribery.

A.5. Drug Abuse, Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Programs

While there are no reliable data on the extent of drug abuse in Afghanistan, opium has traditionally been used by segments of the population. Estimates in the 1970's put drug users, primarily opium smokers, in the 125,000 to 350,000 range. There are indications, however, that the smoking of heroin is on the increase. Press reports state that drug abuse - both heroin and hashish - among the Soviet forces has risen sharply and is of growing concern to the Soviet authorities.

C. Data Tables

Opium/heroin	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
Hec. Cultivated	10-20,000	12-25,000
Hec. Eradicated	Minimal	Minimal
Opium Yield (MT)	300-400	320-420
Opium Loss (MT)	30-40	30-40
Opium Seized (MT)	4	4
Opium Consumed (MT)	30-40	30-40
Opium Available for Export/Refining (MT)	240-320	260-340

PAKISTANA. 1. Status of Illicit Narcotics Production/Trafficking

Pakistan is both a producer of opium and a processor of Southwest Asian opium into heroin. The principal U.S. narcotics objective remains the eventual elimination of this opium poppy cultivation and curbing the production and trafficking of opium and its derivatives (i.e., morphine and heroin). An estimated 2.5 metric tons of heroin produced from Southwest Asian opium enters the United States annually, largely refined in or transshipped through Pakistan. Pakistani opium production has declined from some 800 metric tons in 1979 to an estimated 40-70 tons in 1985. Improved information reveals Pakistani production to be higher than originally estimated (40-50 mt in 1984). The principal cultivators of opium in Southwest Asia are Afghanistan and Iran; however, much of the Afghan production is refined in and/or trafficked through Pakistan.

The United States will continue to assist the Government of Pakistan (GOP) in its efforts to enforce its statutory proscription against opium poppy cultivation, production, refining and trafficking.

A survey of some 2,200 individuals confirms a change in the perception that drug abuse is an external problem. Most respondents believed the use of heroin and opium is serious and on the upswing, and that the GOP should accord a high priority to enforcement efforts. The evidence is that President Zia, Prime Minister Junejo and the overwhelming majority of the political establishment share these views.

It is not known how much opium is consumed in Pakistan. A 1984 survey by the Pakistani Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) estimated that 30 metric tons of heroin (of 60 percent purity) was consumed in Pakistan by what was conservatively estimated to be 150,000 addicts. However, the PNCB estimated unofficially in 1985 that the heroin addict population could be as high as 300,000 persons. (The higher addict figure may be correct, but it calls into question the estimates on domestic use; the consumption rate previously cited would mean that 300,000 addicts used 60 metric tons of heroin, equal to 396 tons of opium, a figure unsubstantiated by any study). The PNCB plans to update the survey and check its methodology.

Opium produced in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) is transshipped by road to the Province's tribal areas where it is refined into heroin, transported by truck to Peshawar and distributed via the following routes:

-- by road southward through the NWFP and the Western areas of Baluchistan adjacent to the Afghan border. From Baluchistan, heroin is transported westward to Iran, Turkey, Europe and the United States.

-- by road southward to the Makran coast (Baluchistan) where it is shipped to the United States via the Persian Gulf States and/or Europe.

-- by road, rail, or plane to Karachi, Rawalpindi, or Lahore where it is routed by sea or air to the United States by way of either New Delhi, Bombay, the Persian Gulf States, and/or Europe.

Pakistan hashish (cannabis resin), produced from local cannabis plants, is exported essentially along the same routes used by the heroin traffickers. Opium and/or heroin originating in Afghanistan also finds its way to Peshawar via the tribal areas east of the Durand Line.

Prior to the 1985-1986 planting season, the retail price of drug opium jumped markedly on the wholesale market in Landi Kotal (NWFP): 1 kg costing the rupee equivalent of approximately \$170, up 300% per kilo for normal semi-dry opium. Over the past two years similar price increases have been reported prior to the new planting season, but at time of harvest, the price drops considerably. Clearly, the announced price increases are to encourage frontier farmers to resist government efforts to halt opium poppy cultivation.

A.2. 1985 Accomplishments

Opium poppies were completely eradicated in the Malakand Agency during the 1984-85 growing season, pursuant to the terms of the enforcement schedule of the FY 1984 Malakand Area Development Project Agreement. In addition, the Pakistan Government adhered to the enforcement timetables governing the Adinzai Tehsil of the Dir District and the Gandaf Union Council of the Gadoon-Amazai area.

Through the first six months of 1985, the PNCS reported seizures of more than 5,000 kgs of heroin and 88,192 kgs of hashish by local enforcement authorities. By comparison, 2,332 kgs of heroin and 50,816 kgs of hashish were captured in 1984. Six heroin laboratories were destroyed in the Northwest

Frontier. Responding to Government pressure, another twenty-three laboratories were surrendered in the Khyber Agency during November and December, 1985.

Following the First Ladies' Conferences on Drug Abuse, Pakistan's First Lady, Begum Zia-ul-Haq, enlisted the cooperation of non-government organizations to tackle the country's domestic drug abuse problem. Begum Zia's involvement in narcotics issues may serve as a catalyst for greater public awareness and for greater GOP enforcement efforts.

The role of international organizations and other donors expanded in 1985. The British and Canadian governments have contributed 2.4 million pounds and \$1 million Canadian dollars respectively to the Special Development and Enforcement Plan, which is being managed by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. The United Kingdom has provided an additional 60,000 pounds for law enforcement equipment and training. Also, Saudi Arabia in 1985 gave UNFDAC a grant of \$1.2 million (over three years) for an education and treatment program.

During the past year, IMM funded a number of demand reduction-related workshops for 250 private medical doctors which provided detoxification and treatment training. In July, sixty social workers in Karachi participated in a seminar on anti-drug community action programs.

In the spring of 1985, the Government of Pakistan signed an agreement with the United States for assistance in conducting an aerial survey of opium poppy cultivation in the NWFP, and for upgrading the laboratory and analytic capabilities of the survey of Pakistan.

The four Drug Enforcement Administration training advisers assigned to the Task Force Units in Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi and Islamabad arrived in the latter half of 1985.

A.3. Plans, Programs and Timetables

The Government of Pakistan is committed in the 1985-86 growing season to extending its opium poppy ban in Gadoon to Gani Chatra and Kabgani, the Union Councils north of Gandaf. Approximately 1,300 acres are expected to be taken out of cultivation this year in these two areas. With respect to Dir, in 1985-86 the Pakistanis are obligated by the terms of the Special Development and Enforcement Plan's (SDEP's) enforcement schedule to eliminate poppies in the Adinzei Tehsil. The ban was extended to Adinzei in 1984-85 under the U.S. outreach program.

A.4. The Adequacy of Legal and Law Enforcement Measures

During the past year, civilian and martial law tribunals have consistently awarded prison terms in narcotics cases commensurate equal to or greater than the statutory minimum of two years. Moreover, judges have been reluctant to grant bail in narcotics cases. The lifting of martial law in December, 1985 has resulted in all narcotics criminal cases being transferred to civilian courts, a move which may mean greater difficulty and delays in prosecuting drug traffickers. During a recent CBC interview, President Zia raised the possibility of having special tribunals assume exclusive jurisdiction over narcotics cases.

In July, the Government of Pakistan declined a U. S. Government 1984 extradition request for Zulfikar Khan, charged in 1984 by a Las Vegas Federal District Court with conspiracy to import heroin into the United States, on grounds that no decision could be made on extradition until Khan completed his three-year sentence on another narcotics offense.

The 1969 Customs Act has yet to be amended to provide for the same minimum two-year penalty required under both the Prohibition Order (Enforcement of Hadd) and the Dangerous Drugs Act for Narcotics Trafficking. Pakistan Customs is in the process of changing the Customs Act in order that it be consistent with the Hadd Ordinance.

There has been a serious effort to extend Government enforcement controls to the tribal areas of the NWFP. As a result, twenty-seven heroin laboratories were destroyed or surrendered this year in the Khyber Agency.

The PMCB, a semi-autonomous agency within the Ministry of Interior, is the principal governmental body concerned with the narcotics control effort. The Government established the PMCB in March 1973 in fulfillment of its obligations under the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The charter creating the Board gives it a wide range of duties of an enforcement, advisory, supervisory and coordinating nature. The PMCB, currently headed by Chairman Dilshad Najmuddin, formerly Inspector General of Police in the Sind and Baluchistan, has regional offices in each provincial capital to which Joint Narcotics Task Force Units (JNTF) are attached. The fifteen JNTF Units are enforcement groups with personnel assigned to them from the PMCB, the Provincial Police, the Provincial Excise and Taxation Departments, and, in certain units, Customs. Although staffing has increased over the past year, INM has postponed the procurement of additional commodities and equipment for the JNTF units pending completed staffing arrangements.

Other governmental agencies responsible for enforcing narcotics laws are: the Customs Service of the Finance Ministry, the Provincial Police Forces; the Provincial Departments of Excise and Taxation; the Federal Investigation Agency; the Airport Security Force; the Coast Guard; the Frontier Constabulary; the Pakistan Rangers; The Northwest Frontier Levies; the Bajaur Scouts; the Dir Scouts; the Malakand Scouts; the Mahsood Scouts; and, the Baluchistan Scouts. With the creation of the joint task forces, and greater appreciation of the seriousness of the narcotics threat, the Provincial Police, once only marginally interested, are increasingly more involved in narcotics interdiction. In addition to the special Customs forces working at ports of entry, the 20 Customs mobile anti-smuggling units became involved this past year in narcotics enforcement.

In 1985, the Government established a Federal Narcotics Law Enforcement Committee, an inter-agency body consisting of senior federal and provincial officials. The committee has agreed to expand the number of joint narcotics task force units and to prepare a program on preventive education.

Besides the 18 DEA officers permanently assigned to Pakistan, the following countries have stationed narcotics enforcement officers in country: Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway Police, Australia.

A.3. Domestic Drug Abuse Policy

The PNCS reports that the number of heroin addicts has increased to at least 300,000 in 1985 from a reported 250,000 in 1983-1984. The Board also estimates 315,000 opium users.

While newspaper articles and television programs warn against the harmful effects of drug usage, preventative education is not included in schools' curricula. INM provided funding in November for a USIA/PNCS sponsored conference aimed at increasing the ability of nongovernmental organizations to work with local communities coping with the narcotics problem. The conference (November 1985), attended by the some 300 individuals, drew the support of Begum Zia and senior GOP officials.

There are twenty-six inpatient and outpatient narcotics treatment centers in Pakistan; 300 beds are reserved for inpatient addiction treatment. The centers, using the "cold turkey" approach coupled with symptomatic treatment of withdrawal pains, report a 20% cure rate, but this figure is questionable as patients are not tracked once they are released.

In an effort to augment the treatment facilities, the U.S.-Pakistan 1984 Demand Reduction Project Agreement called for funding to train approximately 250 private medical practitioners in the treatment and rehabilitation of narcotics addicts. 1985 Demand Reduction Project monies will be used to train more physicians in the coming year.

B.1. Nature of Illicit Drug Production

There is no licit narcotics production in Pakistan. The PNCD estimates that 40 metric tons of opium were produced from 1,788 hectares of opium poppies grown in Dir, Gadoon, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai and the Black Mountains. Gross cultivation, before eradication of 90 hectares, is estimated at 1,878 hectares. As noted before, the Board's survey does not include such growing areas as South Waziristan, Kurran, Khyber and Kohistan. The Board's survey, as in earlier years, is based on physical inspections, a review of Provincial Department of Agriculture records, and interviews with area farmers.

The U.S. estimate is that opium production, reported in the previous INCSR at 40-50 mt, was at 40-70 mt in 1985, with cultivation in the range of 1,778 to 3,566 hectares. While opium production may have increased marginally in 1985, the estimate largely reflects improved data on cultivation and production, particularly on opium cultivation in remote areas of the NWFP. The projections are also based upon recent reports indicating increased opium poppy cultivation in those areas not now subject to the ban on cultivation, i.e., areas lacking development projects.

A more definitive assessment of 1985 production awaits analysis of the photography acquired during the 1985 survey. A second survey is in preparation for 1986.

Again, it is estimated that 2.5 metric tons of Southwest Asian heroin reaches the United States, following its manufacture in or transshipment through Pakistan, primarily from Afghanistan. An estimated 3.6 metric tons of Southwest Asian heroin were exported to Europe from Pakistani sources. An unknown quantity of raw opium is also sent to Iran to satisfy its addict population. Production of opium in both Afghanistan and Iran may be as high as 400 metric tons annually, according to U.S. estimates.

Cannabis, which grows wild throughout Pakistan, is systematically cultivated in Chitral and other northern areas of the country, but records are not kept on this crop.

B.2. Factors Affecting Production:

Geographic, economic, social, and political considerations are interrelated in the narcotics control equation. The rugged, mountainous terrain of the NWFP is conducive to poppy growth and the cash return in rainfall areas is higher than for licit crops. The development of the economic infrastructure of the poppy growing areas (e.g., Malakand area development project), along with the introduction of higher yield varieties of conventional crops, are important considerations which allow the GOP to enforce its ban on opium cultivation. Moreover, linking opium reduction to Islamic principles in the deeply religious tribal regions has sometimes been an effective government strategy. Independence of tribal groups in Baluchistan and the NWFP make enforcement efforts even more difficult if no other forms of cash crops can be grown. Pakistan enforcement efforts are also hindered by the ability of drug traffickers and processors to operate more freely in Afghanistan, just west of the Pakistani border.

The light winter rains contributed to reducing opium output during 1984-85. According to the PNCB estimates, the shortage of rainfall was a factor in decreasing the estimated area under cultivation from about 2,750 hectares in 1983-84 to 1,878 hectares in 1984-85.

While individual Afghan refugees are known to be involved in the heroin trade -- as opium farmers, stockists, refiners, middlemen, or traffickers -- there is no evidence indicating that the Afghan Mujahadeen freedom fighters have been involved in narcotics activities as a matter of policy to finance their operations. Mujahadeen leaders have stated publicly they will not become involved in the narcotics trade. Also, there is no evidence suggesting that the political opposition (Pakistan Peoples Party or others) has been involved in narcotics. Some opposition leaders in the NWFP, however, have in the past advised poppy farmers to continue growing opium poppy until such time as the GOP is prepared to reimburse for lost income.

It is extremely difficult to quantify the income generated by narcotics in Pakistan, but the figure is believed to be significant. As elsewhere, the profits increase along the production network from farmer to trafficker, and Pakistanis are increasingly engaged as traffickers and distributors.

As in the case of many less-developed countries, Pakistan is a society where law enforcement is a poorly paid profession. Financially-strong traffickers are often able to thwart government control efforts with gratuities given to enforcement officials. With four notable exceptions, the major

traffickers in Pakistan have eluded arrest. However, the PNCB, as well as Pakistani Customs, have assisted and facilitated DEA-initiated investigations which have resulted in the arrest within the United States of major traffickers who are Pakistani nationals. DEA officials note the corruption, but say there are numerous dedicated law enforcement officials in Pakistan, fully committed to close coordination in the fight against narcotics trafficking.

B.3. Maximum Achievable Reduction

U.S. and Pakistani officials agree that production in 1985 could have been higher, if there had been sufficient rainfall.

The Government of Pakistan projects that net cultivation and opium output in the 1985-86 growing season will be 1,528 hectares and 35 metric tons. This assessment says that production is falling by 5 mt of opium per year for 1985 and 1986. U.S. officials estimate 1986 cultivation and output could range from 1,500 hectares to as high as 2,800 hectares, yielding 35-65 metric tons of opium, compared to an estimated 40-70 metric tons in 1985. Both estimates assume eradication of 350 hectares and a yield of 22.9 kg of opium per hectare.

NWFP Governor Fazle Haq repeatedly voiced his strong opposition to opium cultivation in the Frontier. Government agencies seem committed to enforcing the poppy cultivation ban in the Malakand Agency, the Adinzai Tehsil of Dir, the Buner Region and the Gandaf, Gani Chatr and Kabgani Union Councils of Gadoon. Other poppy growing areas of the NWFP, however, are not encompassed by this year's enforcement schedules: upper Dir, the areas of Gadoon north of Gani Chatra and Kabgani, Bajaur, Mohmand, the Black Mountains, Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, and Kohistan. Moreover, the current price of dry opium in the wholesale market of Landi Kotal (i.e., rs. 2700 or \$170 per kg.) may stimulate increased cultivation to as much as 9,000-10,000 acres.

The PNCB anticipates that during the 1986-87 season poppy output will decrease to 25-30 metric tons, assuming the ban on opium cultivation will be completely enforced in all of Gadoon and in one-third of Dir. (Projection figures are not available for opium poppy cultivation in the Adinzai, Timegara, Munda, Balambat, Samar Bagh and the Lal Qila areas of Dir.)

B.4. Methodology

PNCB estimates are based on surveys, which cover production areas that account for about 90% of total opium production and use actual on-site inspection and measurement.

in addition to interviews with farmers and Agriculture Department personnel. U.S. estimates augment this information.

C.1. Statistical Tables

Summary Table - Opium/Heroin (1985):

Hectares Cultivated	1,878
Hectares Eradicated	90
Hectares Harvested	1,788
Opium Yield (22.3 kg/ha)	40 metric tons
Loss Factor	not known
Opium Seized (thru 6/85)	1,426 kgs
Opium Consumed	not known
Opium Exported	not known
Opium Available for Refining	not known
Heroin Produced	not known
Heroin Seized (thru 6/85)	2,837 kgs
Heroin Consumed In-country	30-60 metric tons (60% purity)
Heroin Exported to U.S.	2.5 metric tons
Heroin Exported Elsewhere	3.6 metric tons

Summary Table - Opium/Heroin (1986): (estimated)

Hectares Cultivated	1,878
Hectares Eradicated	350
Hectares Harvested	1,528
Opium Yield	35 metric tons
Loss Factor	not known
Opium Consumed	not known
Opium Seized	1 metric ton
Opium Exported	not known
Opium Available for Refining	not known
Heroin Produced	not known
Heroin Seized In-country	2.5 metric tons
Heroin Consumed In-country	30 metric tons
Heroin Exported to USA	2.0 metric tons
Heroin Exported Elsewhere	2.0 metric tons

Notes:

It is not known how much of the heroin refined in Pakistan is produced from Pakistani as opposed to Afghan opium, nor are there reliable estimates on domestic opium and heroin consumption.

Summary Table - Cannabis (1985)

Hectares Cultivated	unknown
Hectares Eradicated	unknown
Hectares Harvested	unknown

Cannabis Seized In-country	88,192 kilos through 6/85
Hashish Yield	unknown
Hashish Consumed	800,000 users
Hashish Exported	unknown
Marijuana Consumed	unknown
Marijuana Exported	unknown

Estimated Summary Table - Cannabis (1986):

Hectares Cultivated	No estimates
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Notes:

DEA estimates that approximately 60% of the hashish available in the U.S. is of Pakistani origin.

Data Tables (Based on PNCB Statistics):

	1986- 1987	1985- 1986	1984- 1985	1983- 1984	1982- 1983
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Note: Asterisk (*) indicates unknown

Gross Cultivation (hectares) (note 3):

Opium	1,116	1,562	1,878	1,750	2,630 (note 1)
Cannabis

Gross Potential Cultivation (metric tons):

Opium	25-30	35	40	45	63
Cannabis

Hectares Eradicated:

Opium	.	.	.	70	210
Cannabis

Crops Eradicated (metric tons):

Opium	.	.	.	1.2	3.7
Cannabis

Hectares Out:

Opium	446	346	223	610	235
Cannabis

Crops Out:

Opium	7.9	5.6	n/a	10.9	4.2
Cannabis

Net Cultivation (hectares):

Opium
Cannabis

Refining:

Heroin : : : : :
 Hashish : : : : :

Notes:

1. Planting starts in fall of one year; harvest is in the spring of the following year. Estimates of potential production are made in spring of following year. Eradication may take place in fall of one year and/or spring of next year. Final estimates of eradication completed are made in the spring.

2. PMCB estimated 9.27 kilograms of opium per acre. With one hectare equalling 2.47 acres, this represents 22.9 kilograms opium per hectare.

Seizures:

Opium	1987	1,000 kgs
	1986	1,500 kgs
	1985	1,426 kgs (thru 6/85)
	1984	8,501 kgs
	1983	19,550 kgs

Heroin	1987	3,000
	1986	3,000 kgs
	1985	5,000 kgs
	1984	2,332 kgs
	1983	3,376 kgs

Cannabis (resin)	1987	80,000 kgs
	1986	80,000 kgs
	1985	88,192 kgs
	1984	50,816
	1983	31,566 kgs

Methaqualine	1987	no estimate
	1986	no estimate
	1985	7,806 (thru 6/85)
	1984	141,446 tablets
	1983	17,341 tablets

<u>Arrests:</u>	1987	15,000
	1986	15,000
	1985	11,313 (thru 6/85)
	1984	27,309
	1983	19,365

The above figures represent total arrests (i.e., foreign and Pakistani nationals).

<u>Lab's Destroyed:</u>	1987	no estimate
	1986	no estimate
	1985	5 and 22 sv
	1984	3
	1983	14 sv
		(sv = surrendered voluntarily)

<u>Licit Production:</u>	1987	none
	1986	none
	1985	none
	1984	none
	1983	none

<u>Users:</u>		
Opium	1987	315,000
	1986	315,000
	1985	315,000
	1984	315,000
	1983	315,000
Heroin	1987	400,000
	1986	400,000
	1985	350,000
	1984	250,000
	1983	100,000
Cocaine	1987	none
	1986	none
	1985	none
	1984	none
	1983	none
Cannabis	1987	800,000
	1986	800,000
	1985	800,000
	1984	800,000
	1983	800,000

D. Status of U.S Assistance

See Appendix

E. Resource Estimates

USAID expects to obligate \$8.8 million in FY 1986 for the Gadoon Project. As a result of this funding, the Government of Pakistan is obligated to extend its opium ban to the Gani Chetra and Kabgsni Union Councils. An estimated 1,537 acres will be taken out of cultivation this growing season. While

USAID will not obligate any additional monies in Gadoon, the remaining Union Councils in Gadoon will fall within the purview of the enforcement ban. At that time, approximately 1,400 additional acres will no longer be sown with poppies.

USAID and other international donors have pledged \$20 million to complete the Dir phase of the Special Development and Enforcement Plan (SDEP). Under the terms of the enforcement schedule which forms an integral part of the SDEP, the Pakistan Government in 1985-86 is not bound to extend the cultivation ban beyond the Adinzai Tehsil, an area which was subject to enforcement measures in the 1984-85 season. The funds pledged to date should generate sufficient development activity to justify extension of the opium poppy ban in Dir to the Timagara, Munda, Salambat, Samar Bagh and Lal Qila areas. It is difficult to assess the extent of cultivation in these areas; such cultivation is not as widespread as it is in eastern Dir (i.e., the sector in which the ban will be extended in 1988-89 through the SDEP).

It is difficult to determine the acreage of poppies which would be taken out of cultivation in 1986 and 1987 if additional funding was available. Nevertheless, authorities believe that if the projected funds were obligated, opium poppy cultivation could be effectively eliminated in Pakistan during the next five years. To accomplish this objective, \$120 million over the course of five years (\$24 million per year) would have to be earmarked to eliminate the country's known remaining poppy growing areas (i.e., Khyber, Kurram, Kohistan, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai and the Black Mountains).